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**Africa Review**

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14 June 1985

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ALA AR 85-013  
14 June 1985

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*Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA. Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief, Production Staff, Office of African and Latin American Analysis,*

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14 June 1985



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## Articles

### Nigeria: Urbanization, Food, and Policy

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Food production in Nigeria, as in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, has not kept pace with population growth. Although the present military regime has made agricultural development a budget priority, policies that in the past that have tended to discourage food production are still in place. By avoiding measures that could increase the income of farmers while providing food imports at prices with which domestic produce cannot compete, successive Nigerian governments have favored the needs of city dwellers over the longer term concerns of agricultural development, in our judgment.

Although Nigerian agriculture appears at first glance to be doing relatively well compared to the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, we believe that statistics on food production in Nigeria are misleading. According to Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) data, for example, the average annual growth rate for food production in Nigeria from 1979 to 1982 was 2.5 percent, compared to only 1.7 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Production of staple crops has been particularly poor, however, and estimated per capita production of staples in 1984 was below that of 1972, according to the Nigerian Central Bank. Furthermore, the FAO production statistics do not allow for the massive spoilage caused by poor transport and inadequate storage facilities. The World Bank estimates that about half of domestic produce is lost before it even reaches the Nigerian consumer.

#### Urbanization and Food

Rapid urbanization has contributed substantially to the decline of Nigerian agriculture. The urban population, which had been only 13 percent of the total in 1960 but reached 21 percent by 1982, is growing by about 5 percent per year, according to the

World Bank, as people migrate to the towns in search of jobs or education. Rural income has been chronically low, providing little incentive for young people to remain in the countryside.

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Urban migration has not only created labor shortages in some rural areas, but also has yielded large urban populations that do not produce food and expect ample food supplies to be available at low prices, according to academic studies. Domestically produced food must pass through an inefficient distribution system that results in shortages and prices in city markets that often are higher than imported food. Urban preferences for rice and wheat—considered by modern urbanites to be more prestigious than the cassava or millet, for example—have been bolstered by exchange rate policies that permit prices for these imported commodities to remain low relative to those for indigenous staples.

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Neither rice nor wheat is a traditional Nigerian staple and neither can be grown there economically. Wheat is produced in small quantities in the north, but it is a temperate crop that can be grown only during the dry season under irrigation and needs fertilizer equivalent to one-third the total weight of the output, according to studies by agronomists. Thanks to the success of an "Eat Bread" advertising campaign staged by Nigerian millers over the last several years, however, the consumption of wheat products has grown rapidly. The overvalued Nigerian currency has helped to keep prices down, so that, according to Head of State Buhari, bread is now the least expensive staple. Rice production is increasing but its future development depends on costly irrigation projects. Locally produced rice in city markets can cost five times as much as imported rice.

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
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## NIGERIA CAPITAL EXPENDITURE ON AGRICULTURE



### Policies

The high cost of food produced domestically, combined with increased consumption of nonindigenous foods, has led to rapid expansion of food imports. The amount spent on imported food rose from \$81 million in 1970 to almost \$3 billion in 1982, although lower world prices for grains and Lagos's success in locating cheaper sources reduced the amount spent to about \$1.5 billion in 1984.

Unlike many African countries, Nigeria does not control the marketing and prices of locally produced food. Lagos can affect the prices of imported foods

indirectly by reducing or increasing the supply to the domestic market. However, food prices have become a highly charged political issue and Nigerian governments have been sensitive to the possibility of unrest in the cities when food costs rise. Attempts to restrict imports through high tariffs and licensing—and at times outright prohibition—have been followed repeatedly by a swing to import liberalization when shortages occurred and prices rose to politically intolerable levels.


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# NIGERIA

## CAPITAL EXPENDITURE ON AGRICULTURE PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES



Shortages and high prices in urban areas were part of the rationale for the December 1983 coup, and the regime has followed a liberal food import policy since coming to power.<sup>1</sup> The severe shortages caused, in part, by the drought in 1983 had led to food price increases of 54 percent between June and December. Despite mounting discontent, the former Shagari government decided not to increase food imports because of the drain on dwindling foreign exchange reserves. The Buhari regime, probably wary of the potential explosiveness of rising urban food prices, gave wheat the highest priority for foreign exchange allocation in 1985.

<sup>1</sup> Soaring food prices also contributed to the coup against General Gowon in July 1975.

Civilian and military governments alike have acknowledged that agricultural development is essential if Nigeria is to feed its growing population, stem urban migration, and create sources of nonoil income. We believe, however, that the country's agricultural programs, beginning with the First Development Plan in 1962 and continuing under the present military government, have been inconsistent, ineffective, and often counterproductive.

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Despite the fact that small farms account for over 90 percent of domestic production, the government's programs have persistently targeted large-scale projects. Furthermore, these agricultural schemes typically are business ventures by those with good political connections but little farming expertise, according to academic studies. Large-scale, high-cost projects that establish farms under government direction for various crops and administer irrigation schemes are not helping the smallholder, according to development experts. Small farmers have limited access to credit; subsidized items like fertilizer, seed, and equipment; and extension services. There is currently only one extension worker per 2,500 farmers in Nigeria, for example, compared to one per 250 in Kenya.

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**Outlook**

The negative trends in Nigeria's agricultural sector probably cannot be reversed soon, or even slowed, given Lagos's desperate financial situation. Although the Buhari government has assigned top priority to agriculture, the 1985 austerity budget gives even less to agriculture than was allocated in 1982. Reduced government spending on agriculture and the country's sharply curtailed capacity to purchase fertilizers and other imports, in our judgment, ensure that per capita agricultural production will continue to decline.

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Lagos's financial problems probably will reduce the market for US agricultural exports, now totaling about \$350 million annually. Although Nigeria's oil earnings will continue to provide more hard currency than is available to other Sub-Saharan nations, Lagos is likely to favor food producers who are cheaper, are willing to provide credit, or agree to countertrade or barter arrangements.

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## Uganda: Military Tensions Increase

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A recent flareup of Langi-Acholi tribal rivalry within the Ugandan Army has put further stress on the stability of the regime of President Obote, a Langi. Obote put Langi troops on military alert in May, suggesting he either feared an Acholi coup, or was looking for a pretext to rein in senior Acholi officers. Obote's decision to create a new Langi special military unit prior to elections scheduled later this year also has contributed to tribal tensions.

These Acholi tensions are real and widespread, but the tribe still suffers from serious internal divisions.

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### Acholi Military Discontent

High-level Acholi military officers long have expressed disgruntlement with the Obote regime. In recent months, however, the number and bitterness of their complaints appear to have increased:

- They claim Langi officers are promoted rapidly to the detriment of Acholi military careers. The most powerful positions are held by Langi officers, many of whom owe personal loyalty to Obote, according to US Embassy sources.
- Acholi members of the military assert that they are sent to the front to fight against insurgents from the National Resistance Army, while Langi enlisted personnel are given noncombat positions.
- Acholi officers favor negotiating with rebel leader Museveni in order to end the insurgency. According to Embassy sources, they believe President Obote and Langi officers oppose negotiations and are prolonging the fighting at the Acholi's expense.
- According to Embassy sources, the Acholis are convinced Obote has forgotten that the Army has been his main source of support since he assumed office in 1980.
- Lastly, Acholis believe they suffered greatest under Idi Amin's regime and are now entitled to some sort of restitution.

### Langi Countermoves

Obote clearly is concerned over the potential threat to his regime from the military and is taking steps to bolster his support. Embassy sources recently revealed that he is intensifying military recruitment in Langi regions. His aim is to create a 5,000-man special brigade personally loyal to him and composed entirely of members of the ruling Ugandan People's Congress party. Embassy sources maintain this brigade will be used as shock troops to intimidate and assassinate rivals of the Obote regime, especially during the upcoming elections. The brigade probably will focus primarily on the small Democratic and National Liberal Parties, supported by the Acholi, but, in addition, will be used to ensure loyalty within the ruling party.

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Obote is determined to augment the security services to ensure stability during the elections, which must be held by December. Since the survival of the Obote regime depends largely on military support, we believe Obote is trying to expand the size and role of the Langi element to serve as the nucleus of a reliable force.

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In one recent incident, Langi troops moved directly against the Acholi. According to Embassy sources, while Lieutenant Colonel Langoya—the Acholi Commander of Engineering and Logistics in the Army and protege of Okello—was away from his headquarters office on 19 April, Langi troops surrounded the building and literally nailed shut his

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**Secret**President Obote 

Camera Press ©

random violence against civilians, however, has served to undermine any existing support for the regime and has encouraged popular support for the rebels.

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- Tensions are running high in the military, and a small incident could ignite serious clashes along tribal lines.

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office door. This action was taken on the orders of Army Chief of Staff Smith Opon Acak, a Langi.

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We believe that the action against Langoya was part of a Langi troop alert. Langi troops drawn primarily from the presidential escort were placed around Army headquarters and at strategic points in Kampala without the knowledge of Okello, whose authority appears to have been circumvented. Langoya, who is rabidly anti-Obote and has been implicated numerous times as a coup plotter, is now under arrest and has been relieved of military duties.

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### Outlook

The growing polarization of the military, furthered by Acholi disgruntlement over the new Langi unit and blatant move against Langoya, increases the potential for instability in Uganda. President Obote's prospects appear bleak as tribal and preelection tensions rise:

- Prime Minister Allimadi and Vice President Muwanga are dissatisfied with Obote's rule and are maintaining a continuing and regular dialogue with the insurgent movement,

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- Although riddled with corruption, tribalism, and personal rivalries, the Army has reached a stalemate in the fighting with the insurgents in southern and western provinces. The Army's

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## Malawi: Succession Sweepstakes

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President Banda has shaken up his Cabinet and civil service over allegations of corruption and inefficiency, changing the lineup of his potential successors. The move may have been orchestrated by John Tembo to remove his main rival, John Ngwiri, as a contender to succeed the 86-year-old President.

President Banda

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### An Unexpected Shakeup

In a special meeting of principal advisers and civil servants on 22 May, Banda accused John Ngwiri, Secretary to the President and Cabinet, of corruption and mismanagement and demanded his resignation, according to US Embassy reporting. Banda also fired Deputy Secretary for Energy and Transportation Kingsley Sulamoyo, a protege of Ngwiri. Sulamoyo was accused of taking kickbacks from South Africa and siphoning government funds into a private Zambian account. Shortly after Ngwiri's resignation, senior civil service employees Gilbert Chirwa and Rex Magombo were fired because of corruption and inefficiency in dealing with donor projects, according to Embassy reporting.

Although Cabinet changes in Malawi are not unusual, we concur with US Embassy reports that the departure of Ngwiri from the President's inner circle represents a dramatic shakeup in the power structure and the succession lineup. As Secretary to the President and Cabinet since 1975, Ngwiri held one of the most powerful positions in the country. A skilled politician, he controlled access to Banda and headed the civil service. Banda has yet to announce Ngwiri's replacement.

Although Ngwiri remains free, and, in our view, will be cleared of corruption charges, Sulamoyo has been jailed. We believe Sulamoyo was a scapegoat for the rise in retail oil prices that resulted from the recent devaluation of the kwacha, a situation which arose while Banda was in the United Kingdom. As Banda's principal energy adviser, Sulamoyo dealt skillfully with various transportation and energy crises faced by Malawi since the loss of rail links with Mozambique. He engineered a successful shift toward South Africa as a



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supplier for diesel and gasoline because of the erratic nature of Zambia as an oil supplier.

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### Succession Prospects

Banda's decision to move against Ngwiri and his supporters may have been influenced by Tembo, former Governor of the Reserve Bank of Malawi. According to Embassy reporting, no one else has the political clout to turn Banda against Ngwiri. In our view, Tembo almost certainly considered Ngwiri a rival to succeed Banda, and may have been concerned over Ngwiri's greater popular and military support. Ngwiri's resignation in disgrace leaves Tembo as the only viable successor to Banda at this time.

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Tembo has had no official status since his removal from the Bank a year ago, but his influence with the President is great. Tembo occupied a place of honor when he accompanied Banda to the United Kingdom in April, and Tembo's niece, official hostess Mama Kadzamira, remains in high favor with Banda. We believe Tembo and his niece fully expect to assume power after Banda leaves office or dies.

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Even if Tembo is seeking to gain the presidency by eliminating other hopefuls, as it is rumored he has

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*John Tembo . . . former Governor of the Reserve Bank of Malawi . . . 52 . . . probably President Banda's closest adviser on financial and economic matters . . . closely identifies with the President's pro-Western policies.*



Daily Times ©

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Even if Tembo is seeking to gain the presidency by eliminating other hopefuls, as it is rumored he has done in the past, his position is tenuous. Tembo has no power base, and his political survival is wholly dependent on Banda's support. Tembo's overtures to the military have not been successful and he and Mama Kadzamira remain highly unpopular, casting doubt on their political survival after Banda dies.

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
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**Secret****Africa  
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**Gabon****Coup Plot Uncovered** 

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The 18-year-old pro-Western regime of President Bongo last month uncovered a coup plot involving junior military officers and members of the elite Air Commando regiment. According to the US Embassy, some 200 officers and enlisted personnel initially were arrested, though few remain in detention. The plot leader, Captain Mandja—who claimed to have experienced a “vision” calling on him to oust Bongo—belongs to a small Christian sect that was banned following his arrest, the US Embassy reports. Embassy officials believe the plot was discovered in its initial stages by Gabon’s military intelligence.

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The 8,000-man Gabonese military—apart from an abortive coup in 1964 that was reversed by French military intervention—does not have a history of political involvement, although grumbling about the quality of its leadership and the poor treatment of junior officers and enlisted personnel surfaces occasionally. Bongo—who remains fully in control of the country—does not trust the military, and last year accused unnamed officers of plotting against him, according to US Embassy reporting. Bongo’s power rests primarily on the 1,600-strong presidential guard, composed largely of fellow Bateke tribesmen. Bongo relies heavily on French advisers, who hold key posts in the presidential guard, Army, Gendarmerie,

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**Secret****Senegal****Political Obstacles to Economic Reform** 

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President Diouf has failed to win the support of his ruling Socialist Party for a new program of economic reforms recommended by the IMF, according to US Embassy sources. The party still appears demoralized by Diouf's attack on its entrenched leadership during the first year of his presidency, and by government austerity measures that have cut sharply into political patronage during the past year. As a result, party organizations are not functioning at either local or national levels,  and party leaders are neither willing nor able to do much to support the President.

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Diouf has proposed sweeping changes in economic management, government payroll, public-sector activity, and the tax system in order to address the financial crisis that has brought the government's popularity to an alltime low. Unless Diouf can develop internal support for the measures—and the party represents his first line of attack—his moderate, pro-Western government could be threatened during the coming year by urban, student, and labor unrest, which would provide openings for radical opposition groups backed by the Soviets and Libyans.

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**The Gambia****Time Has Run Out** 

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The Gambia's foreign resources are exhausted and it faces an indefinite shortfall of food and fuel. Unless Banjul can pay its arrears to the IMF, credit sources will dry up until the Fund reschedules a standby agreement in the fall, according to Embassy reporting. Although the United States has promised emergency food aid, US Embassy sources predict The Gambia's food supplies will be exhausted by the end of June. The shortage of foreign exchange to purchase fuel will seriously affect the availability of transport and electricity.

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The grim economic situation has stimulated political protest in Parliament and opposition newspapers. If President Jawara's government is unable to procure essential goods, we believe it will face food riots and increasing dissident activity by the Movement for Justice in Africa, the small, socialist-oriented opposition party. Senegalese troops moved into The Gambia after a leftist coup attempt in 1981, and have remained as a security force. If public disorders ensue and require the Senegalese to maintain order, the Jawara government may collapse, possibly speeding the progress of the country's planned union with Senegal in a Senegambia confederation.

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**Secret****Kenya****Party Elections Announced** 

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Kenyan President Moi recently announced that long-awaited elections for positions in the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU), the country's sole political party, will be held 22-25 June. The announcement follows a major four-month KANU recruitment drive. Most of the election results are foregone conclusions as the majority of the candidates are members of Parliament with strong power bases in their constituencies. The only real contests will take place at low party levels that lack established candidates in which Moi will try to ensure that his preferred candidate is elected. Moi demonstrated his authority over KANU last year by expelling 15 senior party officials, an action that exacerbated tribal tensions and political infighting. He clearly has concluded that, despite increasing factionalism, his control is sufficiently strong to proceed with elections at this time.

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